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Silber: Commercial Litigators Reveal All: Exploring Commercial Litigation

ESSAY
COMMERCIAL LITIGATORS REVEAL ALL:
EXPLORING COMMERCIAL LITIGATION
IN NEW YORK STATE COURTS*
Norman L Silber*
Why investigate a 3 volume, 68 chapter, 3,314 page reference set
that contains a small mountain of information and advice written by 94
leading practitioners and judges?' One reason is to see how such a group

* Robert L. Haig, editor-in-chief. A joint venture of the West Publishing Company and the
New York County Lawyers' Association, 1995.
** Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. Many thanks to Sandra Capobianco
and Eliana Schonberg for their research assistance, and to Paul Fasciano for comments and thoughts
on earlier drafts.
1. 2-4 NEW YORK COUNTY LAWYERS' ASS'N, COMMERCIAL LMGATION IN NEW YORK
STATE COURTS (Robert L. Haig et al. eds., 1995) [hereinafter COMMERCIAL LITIGATION]. This three
volume collection is part of a seven volume set entitled West's New York PracticeSeries.
Robert L. Haig, editor-in-chief, has written and lectured extensively on litigation topics. He
is a partner at the law firm of Kelley Drye & Warren in New York City. The authors of the chapters
were at the time of publication, with few exceptions, partners at large firms with substantial
commercial litigation practices, and judges in the New York State court system. They are Stewart
D. Aaron of Dorsey & Whitney; Robert M. Abrahams of Schulte Roth & Zabel; John L. Amabile
of Putney, Twombly, Hall & Hirson; Arthur H. Aufses III of Kramer, Levin, Naftalis, Nessen, Kamin
& Frankel; Celia Goldwag Barenholtz of Kronish, Lieb, Weiner & Hellman; Garrard R. Beeney of
Sullivan & Cromwell; Mark A. Belnick of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison; Charles G.
Berry of Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy; Richard L. Bond of Dorsey & Whitney; David M.
Brodsky of Schulte Roth & Zabel; John F. Cannon of Sullivan & Cromwell; P. Kevin Castel of
Cahill Gordon & Reindel; Ellen M. Coin of Graubard Mollen & Miller, J. Peter Coll, Jr. of Donovan
Leisure Newton & Irvine; The Honorable Barry A. Cozier, Justice, New York State Supreme Court,
Second District, and Deputy Chief Administrative Judge, New York City Courts; Donald Francis
Donovan of Debevoise & Plimpton; Richard E. Donovan of Kelley Drye & Warren; Robert S.
Duboff, Director of Mercer Management Consulting, Inc., the parent company of Decision Research;
Peter G. Eikenberry, Esq.; Blair C. Fensterstock of Sutherland, Asbill & Brennan; William R.
Golden, Jr. of Kelley Drye & Warren; David M. Gouldin of Levene, Gouldin & Thompson; The
Honorable Stewart F. Hancock, Jr., retired Associate Judge, New York State Court of Appeals;
Joseph S. Hellman of Kronish, Lieb, Weiner & Hellman; David L. Hoffberg of Nixon, Hargrave,
Devans & Doyle; Laura B. Hoguet of White & Case; Stephen M. Hudspeth of Coudert Brothers;
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has answered reverberating questions about the system of dispute
resolution that lawyers and commercial venturers live with. Do litigators
believe that judges and juries decide cases consistently with established
doctrine, so that outcomes in thousands of cases and settlements mesh

together? Do they think the law is settled enough to provide a basis for
effective litigation counseling? Do they believe that adversarial imperatives have warped the behavior and self-esteem of lawyers or improved

Gary S. Jacobson of Kelley Drye & Varren; J. Christopher Jensen of Cowan, Liebowitz & Latman;
Jay B. Kasner of Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom; Stephen L. Kass of Carter, Ledyard &
Milbum; The Honorable Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge, New York State Court of Appeals; Stephen
Rackow Kaye of Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn; Louis B. Kimmelman of O'Melveny &
Myers; The Honorable Theodore R. Kupferman, Associate Justice, Appellate Division of the New
York State Supreme Court, First Department; Deborah E. Lans of Morrison Cohen Singer &
Weinstein; Bernice K. Leber of Epstein Becker & Green; Mark D. Lebow of Coudert Brothers;
Burton N. Lipshie of Stroock & Stroock & Lavan; Mitchell A. Lowenthal of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen
& Hamilton; Alan Mansfield of Greenberg, Traurig, Hoffman, Lipoff, Rosen & Quentel; Peter J.
Mastaglio of Cullen & Dykman; Sayward Mazur of Mazur, Carp & Rubin; John P. McCahey of
Hahn & Hessen; Thomas McGanney of White & Case; Joseph T. McLaughlin of Shearman &
Sterling; Edwin B. Mishkin of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen & Hamilton; James C. Moore of Harter,
Secrest & Emery; The Honorable Francis T. Murphy, Presiding Justice, Appellate Division of the
New York State Supreme Court, First Department; Richard E. Nolan of Davis Polk & Wardwell;
John M. Nonna of Werner & Kennedy; The Honorable Geoffrey J. O'Connell, Justice, New York
State Supreme Court, Tenth District; James M. Ringer of Rogers & Wells; Gary L. Rubin of Mazur,
Carp & Rubin; Edward L. Sadowsky of Tenzer Greenblatt; Jay G. Safer of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene
& MacRae; Frederick P. Schaffer of Schulte Roth & Zabel; The Honorable George Bundy Smith,
Associate Judge, New York State Court of Appeals; Robert S. Smith of Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison; James L. Stengel of Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine; Harry P. Trueheart,
III of Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle; Kevin J. Walsh of Kelley Drye & Warren; and Stephen
A. Weiner of Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts.
The co-authors were at the time of publication, with few exceptions, associates at large law
firms with substantial commercial litigation practices. They are Liza R. Berliner of Skadden, Arps,
Slate, Meagher & Flom; Jennifer B. Bernheim of Kelley Drye & Warren; Frederick A. Brodie of
Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts; Lynn E. Busath of Davis Polk & Wardwell; Irene Chang of
Shearman & Sterling; Flor M. Col6n of Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle; Jodi A. Danzig of Paul,
Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison; Richard A. De Palma of Coudert Brothers; Laurie Strauch Dix
of Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine; Leonard Allen Feiwus of Proskauer Rose Goetz &
Mendelsohn; Thomas F. Fleming of Rogers & Wells; Janet A. Gordon, Senior Court Attorney, New
York State Supreme Court; Michael C. Griffen of Hancock & Estabrook; Elisa F. Hyman of White
& Case; Christopher P. Johnson of Donovan Leisure Newton & Irvine; Jonathan Z. King of Cowan,
Liebowitz & Latman; Richard A. Lingg of Shearman & Sterling; Robert Malaby of Carter, Ledyard
& Milburn; Jean M. McCarroll of Carter, Ledyard & Milbum; Robert P. McGreevy, Law Secretary
to The Honorable Theodore I Kupferman, Associate Justice, Appellate Division of the New York
State Supreme Court, First Department; James F. Parver of Proskauer Rose Goetz & Mendelsohn;
Dorothea W. Regal of White & Case; Harold E. Schimkat of White & Case; Amelia T.R. Starr of
Davis Polk & Wardwell; Beverly G. Steinberg of LeBoeuf, Lamb, Greene & MacRae; Gloria M.
Trattles of O'Melveny & Myers; Kevin C. Walker of Kelley Drye & Warren; Carol E. Warren of
Nixon, Hargrave, Devans & Doyle; Michael R. Wright of Levene, Gouldin & Thompson; and
Andrew M. Zeitlin of Tenzer Greenblatt.
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it? Is the dispute resolution system, as many declare, "ina crisis"?2
This Essay submits that the authors of Commercial Litigation in
New York State Courts ("Commercial Litigation") harbor views that
reflect those of a substantial part of the litigation bar--particularly of the
larger New York City firms. It argues that, to a significant degree, these
practitioners (and some judges) account for their success and the state of
the law with a set of unsentimental assumptions about the dispute
resolution system. Their perspective combines socio-culturally rooted
subjectivity to explain what judges and juries do (Part I); with claims of
doctrinal indeterminacy to explain much of their own difficulty in
counseling and litigating efficiently (Part II); with an anti-conciliatory
game theory to explain the dance they do with their adversaries (Parts I
and IV); with an acknowledgement of institutional bias in procedural
rules and substantive doctrine to explain the sometimes harsh social
justice that litigation produces (Part V). In the process of delivering
practitioners a sophisticated bundle of information and revealed wisdom,
CommercialLitigation offers a picture of the profession's self-awareness
and its "natural attitude" toward litigation that undermines theories about
the cooperativeness of litigators and fortifies certain popular and
scholarly misgivings (Part Vl).4
Answering a concrete question with an immediate bearing on a legal
dispute, of course, is more typically the purpose for consulting a set like
Commercial Litigation. This set will be consulted in bits and pieces by
practicing attorneys and judges searching for basic, sensible advice and
for finer points of law, and it should reward most inquiries of this kind.
CommercialLitigation contains hundreds of discussions ranging in topic
from the rules of trial and motion practice and advisable methods for
framing specific types of pleadings, to cost-effective ways to manage
corporate litigation, to the many varieties of alternative dispute resolution
and settlement techniques.' The analyses and factual presentations are
2. See infra Part VI.
3. Almost all of the authors appear to work at large firms with sophisticated litigation
practices and substantial support for their representation of clients. See supra note 1.
4. Understanding the "natural attitudes" or "perspectives" of lawyers offers a way to think
about their motivations without reducing them to the vocabulary of transaction economics and
behavioral psychology. See, e.g., Edward L. Rubin, The Phenomenology of Contract: Complex
Contracting in the Entertainment Industry, 152 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 123, 125

(1996) ("While much of phenomenology is metaphysical, and far removed from anything so
mundane as contracts, it also contains an analysis of ordinary life, which Husser referred to as the
natural attitude.").

5. The set also includes advice which discourages litigation of some disputes. See, e.g., 2
COMMERCIAL LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 3.10, at 71.
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handled deftly and in many instances in an engaging style. Checklists,
exhibits, tables, forms, and illustrative documents are sprinkled helpfully
throughout the work, which even comes with a computer disk full of
model forms, and should help attorneys to simplify and standardize their
filings and lower their costs.6 As a whole, the set does not demonstrate
a bias toward defendants or plaintiffs. It is a comprehensive work which
does not condescend to, confine, or significantly oversimplify its subject
matter, and which will have utility for commercial litigators throughout
the country whose clients do business under the laws of New York.
The utilitarian design also permits the set to illuminate more general
questions, because it reveals without much varnish the individual views
of distinguished attorneys about the dynamics of contemporary commercial litigation. It differs from other reference works because Robert L.
Haig, the editor-in-chief, decided to incorporate individually authored
guides to litigation strategy and tactics in most of the sixty-eight
chapters. These guides are sometimes integrated into topical discussions
and sometimes provided separately. Together they confront many of the
problems and pitfalls of commercial litigation quite candidly-sometimes
to the point of indiscretion. As a result of the "tell-it-like-it-is" candor,
the strategic advice and the doctrinal explanations lend cumulative weight
to some ignoble explanations for attorney behavior and judicial
reasoning.
I. HommS AND VERiTiES: THE REAL SECRETS OF SUCCESS
Commercial Litigation does not define the professional habits and
character traits that produce the masters of commercial litigation-but as
it addresses one litigation topic after another it provides comment about
what the cherished talents are and how to acquire them.
A.

Traditional Values

The model litigator conducts mountains of preparatory work and
investigates the minute details of a dispute.7 He or she organizes
activities into checklists, meticulously plans for contingencies, and
focuses on every detail.' The litigator understands the implications of

6. The computerized forms can be loaded onto the hard drive of a personal computer and
referred to regularly through standard word-processing software.
7. See, e.g., 2 COMMERCIAL LITIGATION, supra note 1, §§ 4.1-4.5.
8. See, e.g., 2 id. §§ 22.4-.5; 3 id. § 47.5; 4 id. §§ 53.3(h)-(i), 53.5(f)-(g), 57.12, 61.19-.20,
62.16-.17.
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filing in one forum and venue as opposed to another.9
Some of the talents litigators need include a refined, systematic
approach to all phases of litigation; case management skills; legal
research competence; good tactical judgment; command over procedural
rules; communicative and persuasive ability; a flair for game playing and
dramatic acting; quick reactions; and client bedside manners of the
highest order.'0 These are said to come from intense study of decisions
and statutes, and from the careful effort to learn from real life situations.
Authors Edwin B. Mishkin and Mitchell A. Lowenthal tell readers that
if they will spend their time considering "the lore and law of service [of
process]," then "it can be effectively and efficiently accomplished."'"
The key to succeeding in tort suits alleging unfair competition is said by
authors J. Christopher Jensen and Jonathan Z. King to be time spent
"understanding . . . the limits of fair competition."' 2 As for case
investigations, author Arthur H. Aufses III states that "[o]nce the lawyer
knows the applicable rules and available resources, her success as an
investigator will be shaped by her curiosity, energy, and time."' 3 In
their chapter on disclosure, authors James M. Ringer and Thomas F.
Fleming stress that "[i]f litigation is 99% preparation and 1% inspiration,
thorough preparation comes only from a well-designed and carefully
planned discovery process.' ' 14
At trial, the good litigator tries methodically to choreograph every
move. Author Stephen Rackow Kaye recommends that inquisitors, when
cross examining, divide questions by topic or sub-topic using index cards
that are "separately assembled (clips, rubber bands or both do very
well)."'" He advises questioners to craft "soft-ball" questions which
narrow the areas of factual dispute, and to develop the intensity of the
questions gradually, "as a dramatic staircase, leading to a surgical cross
examination of the hotly disputed facts."' 6 Commercial Litigation
encourages attorneys to concentrate on calibrating and controlling

9. See, e.g., 2 id. §§ 10.1, 10.5; 4 id. § 55.3(a)(5).
10. In keeping with a profession of attorneys schooled to be generalists and jacks and jills of
all trades, neither practical business experience nor business or accounting training would appear
especially important.
11. 2 COMERCIAL LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 2.14, at 49.
12. 4 id. § 63.2, at 629.

13. 2 id. § 4.5.
14. 2 id. § 18.2(b), at 589.
15. 3 id. § 33A(d), at 204.
16. 3 id. § 33.5(d), at 206.
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demeanor when negotiating with adversaries or arguing in court. 17 The
timing of requests and advice is crucial." The ideal commercial litigator
who emerges in composite from all these segments is intelligent, surefooted, relentless, indomitable, and obsessive.
B.

Subversive Thoughts

Together with homilies and evocations of the requisite virtues of
hard work and careful planning, many of the authors of Commercial
Litigation communicate in a strong undertone a distressing and depressing message--that the procedures and rules of the common law are
deeply flawed and incoherent. The commercial litigation system, they
stress, does not regularly yield predictable results no matter how wellprepared, astute, and forceful the litigator. No matter how strong the
client's case is, the client may be defeated by being worn down, outspent, out-maneuvered, or unlucky. One side or the other can be derailed
for reasons that, in truth, ought not bring credit or blame to any of the
litigants.
Commercial Litigation describes available approaches in making
many theoretical and strategic decisions which present themselves once
a litigant has filed a complaint and requested judicial intervention.
Readers are told that arriving at the right answers depends no less on
accurate psychological and sociological analysis than it does on
understanding the rules that govern successful motion practice and the
presentation of evidence.
It appears that mind-reading, egg-crate walking, ego-flattering, and
probing jurisprudential values and procedural inclinations are useful
skills. Doing well with a judge, according to Stephen Rackow Kaye,
requires "learning about ...[his] preferences." 9 No matter how sound
a case, careful study of the judge is indispensable to success:
Every trial judge is different, each with a different... education;
different legal and judicial career; different personal background;
different character, personality and temperament; different intelligence
and capabilities; different philosophies; different biases and prejudices;
different support staff; and other differences.
...[D]ifferences

in their attitudes, perceptions and preferences

17. See, e.g., 2 id. §§ 27.3(a), at 895, 27.7(a), at 904; 3 id. § 31.4(d).
18. See, e.g., 2 id. §§ 20.3(c), 22.2(d), 27.6(b).
19. 3 id. § 30.2(f), at 10.
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[dictate that] elements of a trial before two equally effective commercial trial judges, with or without a jury, should be handled quite
differently."
Once discovery has begun, authors James M. Ringer and Thomas F.
Fleming note, the scope of permissible disclosure is "ultimately a
subjective question that each court in a given ...case must resolve." 21
Author John L. Amabile observes that "it is the court's ultimate
obligation to determine whether a cause of action exists."' In the face
of a motion to dismiss a complaint, Amabile states, courts have searched
"beyond the four comers of the complaint" to determine the viability of
a claim. 23 Justice Geoffrey J. O'Connell does not defuse concern about
the possible danger of pushing a judge to render an overdue decision on
a motion:
There is the old saw about a given action such as a letter to the
administrative judge which will not only produce a decision, but enable
the writer to predict what the decision will be. However, not all judges
are autocrats nor cut from the same mold. Some may appreciate a
reminder that cures an oversight, others may not. A copy of Dickens'
Bleak House might entertain one judge and offend another. As counsel
must learn each jurist's individual rules and procedures, so must they
try to acquaint themselves with individual foibles.24
In the end, courts appear to respond to attorneys based on a subjective
perception of their duty.
In an even more cautionary fashion CommercialLitigation presents
the subject ofjuries. As a threshold matter, Stephen Rackow Kaye writes,
determining whether to ask for a jury demands a calculation of the
probable sociological, cultural, and psychoanalytical profile of the jurors,
the parties, and the witnesses. The decision to go for a jury should be
based on such considerations as the "wealth, social position, education,
[and] occupation [of the parties and their witnesses,] and the appearance
of those same considerations on a potential judge or jury.' 25 Kaye's
advice is supported by his recollection of a complex partnership matter
in which the defendants based their decision to request a jury trial on two

20. 3 id. § 30.2(f), at 10-11.
21.
22.
23.
24.

2
2
2
2

id. § 18.3(a), at 591.
id. § 6.5(c), at 157.
id.
id. § 24.15(a), at 802.

25. 3 id. § 30A(f), at 33.
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considerations that had only the most remote connection to fairness or
the support of legal doctrine, namely, "the potential difficulty of the jury
in sifting through the issues and the evidence" and "the appearance that
the plaintiff limited partners were wealthy investors who had already
earned a lot of money in the partnership and were seeking now to
' Litigators who
recover large additional damages."26
become involved
in a jury trial are warned that it is critical to account for the differences
between the classes and ethnic backgrounds of the litigants and jurors.
Juries are frequently composed of middle and lower class folk, while the
witnesses as well as the parties often are part of a better educated and
well-heeled elite:
In a commercial case, commonly the types of fact witnesses will be
corporate executives, bankers, real estate developers ....accountants,
bookkeepers, investors and other types of business people. As a class,
they will be highly educated, often professional, expected by judge and
jury to conform to high ethical standards, be able to recall past events
and to tell the truth. This adds to the demands of effective personal
performance by those parties and witnesses.2 7
His advice about jury behavior further indicates that some jurors will
resist the most intensive, intricate, and painstaking efforts to educate
them. Joseph S. Hellman finds that "it is sometimes difficult to
understand why people fight to get in front of a jury,"2 since jurors
may never understand what the case is all about:
In the IBM antitrust case which resulted in a jury deadlock in 1978, the
press reported that one juror was asked the meaning of the term
"interface" and he responded: "Well, if you take a blivet, turn it off one
thing and drop it down, it's an interface change, right?"29
The lesson CommercialLitigation imparts here is hard to miss: both
judges and juries are dangerously idiosyncratic; there is an unquantifiable
and uncontrollable risk that they will not render a doctrinally based
outcome. Notwithstanding the objective facts or the dictates of a rule, the
results may be the fruit of bigotry, stupidity, and unsophistication.
Commercial Litigation presses the argument that socioeconomic,
educational, and class differences among the parties, between the parties

26.
27.
28.
29.
Dec. 21,

3 id. § 30.4(0, at 34.
3 id. § 30.2(c), at 7.
3 id.
§ 41.2, at 569.
3 id. (quoting Stephen J. Adler, Can JuriesDo Justice to Complex Suits?, WALL ST. J.,
1989, at BI).
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and the jurors, and between the parties and the judges, frequently play a
determinative role in shaping the outcomes of trials in commercial cases.
For years, contrary themes-which emphasize just desserts, the
objectivity of American judicial institutions, and the primacy of positive
statements of law--have laced many other reference works that line law
libraries.
The tone of subjectivity and social context mirrors modem reevaluations of how laws are made and interpreted. A variety of
jurisprudential perspectives, including law and economics, critical legal
studies, public choice theory, critical race theory, and law and society,
reflect the original anti-formalist and sociological approach of the Legal
Realist Movement, which long ago exposed bias in legal institutions. °
We live in an age when post-modem academic criticism has challenged
the significance of authorship and the meaning of texts of all kinds; when
empirical analysis of court opinions and jury verdicts has confirmed that
subjective factors do play a role in shaping outcomes; and when the
nature of subjective influences has been magnified in high-profile cases.
As Professor Jeffrey W. Stempel explains: "Legal Realism revolutionized
the profession's thinking about law, making it virtually impossible for
thoughtful lawyers to regard litigation procedure and policy as completely divorced from the politics of substantive outcomes."3'
Many readers nevertheless will find it disturbing and perhaps
mistaken for so many of the authors to have infused this soon-to-be
standard reference work with, if not an extreme Realist perspective,32
then an agnostic position about whether judges and juries are ultimately

30. Legal Realism, of course, is the name often given to approaches which at their heart deemphasize formal legal doctrine, and instead emphasize social relations and empirical research as

a basis for analyzing the outcome of legal disputes. It found its most prominent expression in the
1920s and 1930s. The popularity of Legal Realism in the legal academy waned after World War II
when it collapsed from its ability to justify too much and predict too little, and after the Legal
Process school exposed excesses and flaws. See generallyMORTON J. HORWtTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870-1960, at 169-246 (1992); Norman Silber & Geoffrey Miller, Toward
"NeutralPrinciples"in the Law: Selectionsfrom the OralHistory of Herbert Wechsler, 93 COLUM.
L. REV. 854, 870-72, 930 (1993). Long after its purported demise, however, it continued to attract
adherents, especially among practitioners, and it strongly influenced the sociological and economic

perspectives of various movements in jurisprudence.
31. Jeffrey W. Stempel, New Paradigm,Normal Science, or Crumbling Construct? Trends in
Adjudicatory Procedureand Litigation Reform, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 659, 668 (1993).
32. One author has described "extreme" Legal Realism as supposing that "judges' decisions
depend on a large number of factors-including what the judge ate for breakfast on the morning of
a decision--so numerous and relating to outcomes in so complex a manner as to obscure the actual
basis for decision." Ronald A. Cass, Judging: Norms and Incentives of Retrospective Decision-

Making, 75 B.U. L. REV. 941, 944 (1995).
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influenced by rules, precedents, and persuasive logic. Commercial
Litigation does not imply that knowing what the legal rules actually are
is unimportant; but it insists that knowledge about the rules is insufficient
to produce success, and must be thoroughly supplemented in any dispute
by a grasp of social context.33
In some respects the elaborate emphasis on social context belies
concerns of Dean Kronman of Yale. Kronman identifies a professional
crisis which has arisen largely because recent generations of lawyers have
failed to conceive of their highest goal as "the attainment of a wisdom
that lies beyond technique-a wisdom about human beings and their
tangled affairs that anyone who wishes to provide real deliberative
counsel must possess., 34 Rather, Kronman laments, today's attorneys
are satisfied with mere technical mastery of the law.35 Commercial
Litigation emphasizes command over technique and immersion in the
rules of law-but only as prefatory to the development of an effective
litigation strategy. And an effective strategy, as these authors see it, must
be based on obtaining "wisdom about human beings and their tangled
affairs," such as the educational level, religion, sex, ethnicity, racial
36
composition, and class bias of the fact-finders and decision-makers.
In light of the strong relation of jury and judicial determinations to
subjective variables, success at litigation looks less assurable to those
attorneys who have been traditionally trained in the law schools than to
those who also are trained in or have access to reservoirs of knowledge
33. For example, Commercial Litigation includes in the neighborhood of 300 practice
checklists to help organize a litigator's approach to problems. See 4 COMMERCIAL LITIGATION, supra

note 1,at 1229-34 (index of checklists). Ascertaining the law is only a small part of many of these
checklists. See, e.g., 2 id. §§ 27.2 (settlement), 28.5 (voir dire); 4 id. § 55.4 (collections litigation).
34. ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER 2 (1993).

35. As Kronman states:
Th[e] crisis [in which the American legal profession is now caught] has been brought
about by the demise of... the belief that the outstanding lawyer-the one who serves
as a model for the rest-is not simply an accomplished technician but a person of
prudence or practical wisdom as well.

Id. Kronman terms this fallen belief"the ideal of the lawyer-statesman." Id. at 3.
For Kronman, the susceptibility of the legal system to technical gaming is a large part of the
problem-it produces the impression that technical mastery of the rules is everything. See generally
id.at 165-352 (discussing individually the negative impact of law schools, law fi'ms, and the courts
on the ideal of the lawyer-statesman).

36. It should be noted that if the perceived importance of these factors is highly significant to
outcomes, it would appear to favor larger firms over smaller ones. Attorneys in large firms and
others whose clients have large budgets may be able to fill the social-scientific prescriptions called
for here; but attorneys in smaller firms, which lack the requisite time, support staff, and financial
resources, will frequently have to proceed without investigating in the manner or depth suggested
by Commercial Litigation.
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about psychology, sociology, political science, anthropology, and other
social science specialties.37
11. DOCTRINAL INDETERMINACY
The open and rough texture of commercial law doctrine also is
central to the broader discussions of litigation technique. It appears that
through interpretation New York courts have embossed certain idiosyncrasies onto many areas of procedure and legal doctrine. In fact,
knowledgeable commercial litigators who sit down with the bulk of
CommercialLitigation may rise discouraged about their ability to counsel
clients with confidence about an appropriate course to follow.3"
Consider the treatment of law regarding tortious interference with
a business contract as an example. The unpredictability of satisfying the
necessary elements to survive a defendant's motion to dismiss a cause of
action in this area of law is high, according to authors Stephen A.
Weiner and Frederick A. Brodie. In spite of straightforward statements
of the essential elements of a cause of action in the case law,39 "New
York courts have differed sharply on the meaning, pleading requirements,
and proof requirements for each element."4 ° The description of New
York doctrine which accompanies this statement indicates that the
unpredictability of surviving a motion to dismiss is particularly hard to
rationalize here since the Restatement of Torts and the leading New York
case law which embrace it state that the presence of intent and wrongfulness "must be determined on a case-by-case basis," upon the presentation
of the evidence.4 ' Nonetheless, readers are informed, many lower courts
impose strict requirements for specificity of evidence at the complaint
stage.42 And so Commercial Litigation advises readers that "lawyers
defending such claims may benefit from attacking the complaint before
undertaking discovery."4' 3

37. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, The DeclineofLmv as an Autonomous Discipline:1962-1987,
100 HARv. L. REv. 761, 769 (1987) ("the overall progress of disciplines other than law in
illuminating law has been striking").
38. But see Lawrence B. Solum, On the Indeterminacy Crisis: CritiquingCriticalDogma, 54
U. CHI. L. REv. 462 (1987) (critiquing the indeterminacy thesis).
39. These essential elements include "(i) a valid agreement; (ii) the defendant's knowledge of
that agreement; (iii) interference with the agreement (iv) which is intentional and improper and (iv)
[sic] which damages the plaintiff." 4 COMMERCIAL LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 59.12, at 425.
40. 4id.
41. 4 id. § 59.17(c), at 439.
42. See 4 id.
43. 4id.
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The connection between indeterminate legal doctrine and the
behavior of attorneys emerges not only in litigation, but in commercial
counseling more generally. Divergence among the lower courts on
pleading and proof requirements makes it hard for lawyers to counsel
would-be plaintiffs about whether to proceed. Different standards in
different courts encourage efforts at forum-shopping. The possibility of
dismissal of a complaint for lack of specificity encourages plaintiffs'
counsel to gold-plate complaints and encourages defendants' counsel to
spar over preliminary matters. Early settlement becomes harder to arrive
at than it would be otherwise, because each side will, rationally, wait for
the preliminary matters to be resolved. It is no wonder that litigation
looks inefficient and unpredictable to outsiders: the profession's own
guidebook describes it this way to insiders.
It does not require a jaundiced eye to see that CommercialLitigation
can also serve as a testament to the fee-generating, uncertainty-provoking, and delay-making consequences of indeterminacy that have led
commercial clients and the public at large to refrain from enforcing their
rights, to disparage the dispute resolution system generally, and to
distrust their own lawyers who engage in such behavior. These attitudes
compose the background atmospherics that lead to opinion poll results
like the one ten years ago which found that nine out of ten parents did
not want a child of theirs to grow up to be a lawyer of any kind."
Both attorneys and their clients might be tempted to reach for
alternative dispute resolution ("ADR"), or for a settlement, instead of
proceeding to court, after reading about so much doctrinal incoherence
and about the possibilities for nonuniform results in many areas of law.
But the inclination is misguided since Commercial Litigation identifies
significant incoherence in the procedures and doctrine controlling these
aspects of practice as well. For example, author Joseph S. Hellman
indicates that New York courts sometimes uphold and sometimes
overturn arbitration awards when an arbitrator declines to admit an
unsworn report.45 The relevant chapters on ADR, arbitration, and
settlement provide many good justifications for being relatively
enthusiastic about these processes, but any urge to avoid the traditional
litigation process for the sake of clarity, simplicity, or even brevity might

44. See ANDREw ROTH & JONATHAN ROTH, DEVIL's ADVOCATES: THE UNNATURAL HISTORY
OF LAWYERS 157 (1989).
45. See 3 COMMERCIAL LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 41.4(e), at 585-86.
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46
be quelled by an exploration of some of the rules.

I.

GAME-PLAYING MANEUVERS

Commercial Litigation also makes it clear that mastering the
litigation process requires a tutored or intuitive appreciation of the theory
and tactics of game playing, in combination with comprehensive
knowledge about the arsenal of procedural techniques and maneuvers that
are available under the statutes and rules. These volumes rehearse many
strategic moves and countermoves. As with most games, litigation can
produce clear winners and losers, 47 and the best moves are usually
intended to direct an opponent to a progressively more vulnerable-and
ultimately indefensible--position.
Some facets of the game are elementary and are not difficult to
execute. Justice Francis T. Murphy, in analyzing whether to argue a case
in the appellate division, emphasizes that "[m]ost importantly, when
counsel chooses not to argue a case, he may be giving the court the
impression that he does not think the case is important or that his client's
position is weak., 48 Authors Mark A. Belnick and Jodi A. Danzig
observe that plaintiffs can frustrate removal to federal court by asserting
only state law claims when drafting a complaint. 49 Former Judge
Stewart F. Hancock, Jr. and attorney Michael C. Griffen indicate that
New York law generally is unsympathetic to commercial plaintiffs who
are out of privity with the seller and who seek to recover damages, and
so they school attorneys that when representing sellers they should
attempt to specify in their contracts that New York law applies.5 0
Stephen Rackow Kaye advises that prior to trial, witnesses should be
taken to the "horse shed" and drilled to prepare them for their testimony:
"Many lawyers drill the witness by going over the entire direct examination in question and answer form, working on each of the witness'
answers if necessary and then conducting a mock cross examination.
Other lawyers go over the testimony more generally . . . ."'I Kaye
46. See 2 id. chs. 10 (arbitration), 27 (settlements); 3 id. ch. 41 (ADR); see also ROBERT A.
BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF MEDIATION (1994); Norman S. Poser, When

ADR Eclipses Litigation: The Brave New World of SecuritiesArbitration, 59 BROOK. L. REV. 1095
(1993).
47. It should be noted, however, that litigation often produces settlements, in which case there
may well be no clear winners or losers.
48. 3 COMMERCIAL LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 47A(g), at 855.
49. See 2 id. § 9.7(a), at 270.

50. See 3 id. § 39.29(b), at 521.
51.

3 id. § 32.3(b), at 117-18.
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cautions that drilling witnesses has its limits, presumably ethical and
formal in nature. He states that "for reasons that need not be elaborated,"
witnesses should never be given scripts.52
Especially useful are the discussions of less straightforward
stratagems which foster appreciation of signals that are sent and received
by the filing of different legal papers and by. "between-the-lines"
communications. Discussing when third-party actions can and should be
brought, James C. Moore reminds readers that motions can communicate
implicit as well as explicit messages to judges and juries. They are told
that initiating a third-party proceeding may signal a court that the
defendant is guilty, because by doing so, "the defendant tacitly concedes
to the trier of fact the possibility that the plaintiff may recover a
judgment against [him]. 53 Moore observes that "the defendant [thereby]
weakens its position for it has admitted to the possibility of a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff."54
Choosing the correct oppositional posture to take among competing
alternatives can effect dramatically the duration and outcome of a
dispute. The ability to signal strength rather than weakness while moving
toward a settlement is a highly prized talent. As a matter of settlement
negotiating style, attorneys are advised not to be conciliatory, because,
according to authors David L. Hoffberg and Carol E. Warren, "a
conciliatory style is likely to be abused and your client unnecessarily
disadvantaged. ' 55 David M. Gouldin and Michael R. Wright encourage,
in settlement talks, the use of bluffing with seemingly irrational timeconsuming or cost-disregarding behavior: 56 "Even though the readiness
of an attorney to try a case does not truly impact the merits, it can, in the
mind of the opponent, subtly affect settlement evaluations which are
critical to obtaining a 'favorable' compromise of the case."5 7 To get an
opposing attorney to think about a settlement well before the trial stage,
Gouldin and Wright urge that attention be paid not just to the formal
effect of a filing but to its psychological impact. Filing a Notice to
Admit, for example, may alert an adversary to the possibility of a
settlement without the implication that the litigator lacks the will to "'go

52. 3 id. § 32.3(b), at 118.

53. 2 id. § 7.7(b)(2), at 220.
54. 2id.

55. 2 id. § 27.7(a), at 904.
56. One author argues that a bluff must be costly or else it would be used so often and by so

many that it would lose its effect. See ROBERT H. FRANK, PASsIONs WITHIN REASON: THE
STRATEGIC ROLE OF THE EMOTIoNs 99-102 (1988).
57. 2 COMMERCIAL LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 22.3(c), at 743.
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all the way' if necessary: "[T]he service of a strategic Notice to Admit
may be a strong opener ....A communication exploring the interest of
your adversary in settling the matter is often construed as a sign of
weakness, while service of a Notice to Admit is not." 58 The use of one
procedural device instead of another can stiffen the resistance
of an
59
opponent or soften it, can delay a litigation or speed it up.
Psychological considerations guide the management and control of
clients as well as adversaries. Encouraging a client to agree to a
settlement requires counsel to identify the emotional needs of the client,
and accordingly, to determine when the best time has arrived to give
advice or bad news. "Matters of principle often become very expensive" and "it may be necessary for you, the objective outside lawyer, to
wait until your client cools off before even breathing the subject of
settlement."6 Readers are reminded that attorneys who fume over a
client who is apparently unreasonable and intransigent may have
forgotten that one major reason the client chose to pursue litigation in the
first place may have been that a matter of principle was involved, and
that compromise truly is unthinkable."
Ironically, many of the maneuvers treated by CommercialLitigation
as indicative of significant talents and strengths are considered to be
personality flaws (even disorders) outside of the profession; and these
game-playing aspects of the resolution process which litigators take for
granted are, on the outside, generally considered individually wasteful of
58. 2iad
59. The authors are quite aware that plaintiffs try to avoid delays in recovering judgments, and
for that precise reason defendants' counsel will often use procedural devices as a standpipe:
In instances where a dispositive motion cannot be employed, debtor's counsel should
utilize appropriate discovery devices. Service of proper demands for disclosure will not
only inform debtor's counsel as to the particulars of plaintiff's cause, but will force
plaintiff to expend its time and money in responding to the demands, and will delay the

recovery ofjudgment.
4 id. § 55.3(b)(2), at 257 (footnote omitted).
60. 2 id. § 27.3(a), at 895. In the end, financial considerations will usually overtake emotions,
and a settlement will be reached:
Business clients increasingly prefer to resolve litigation in the most financially beneficial
manner possible. Even where emotions run high at the outset ("we'll fight this one all the
way to the Supreme Court"), chances are that as the litigation drags on, disrupting the
company's productivity and draining revenue, your client will eventually see the benefit
to getting the litigation wrapped up in a manner that is definite and final....
...Certainly, you must assure your client as well as your opponent that you will
go "all the way" if necessary. But your thinking must include how you will position the
case so that it can be settled for the right amount at the right time.
2 iad§ 27.2, at 892.

61. See 2 id. § 27.3(a), at 894-95.
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time and expense and socially counter-productive.
The practitioners in Commercial Litigation tell insiders that good
litigating often comes down to displaying strong game-playing skill; the
skill of knowing when to bluff, when to delay, when to appear irrational,
when to dodge and feint. To outsiders, these are among the classic venal,
manipulative qualities--coyness, brinkmanship, legerdemain, and the
inclination to rely on procedural artifices--that have been cursed for ages
by those uninitiated into the lawyer's guild.62
The advice designed by the authors to provide constructive guidance
for practitioners is in essential respects consistent with criticism that has
modeled lawyers as "agents of the devil," meaning that adaptation to the
rules frequently eventuates in the sowing of discord, the prolonging of
litigation, and the ratcheting up of fees. 63 To clients tangled in commercial disputes, and to the public, truthseeking and the pursuit of efficient
justice look like the last things the litigation game is designed to
promote.
IV. ANTI-CONCILIATORY INCENTIVES

Testing the arcane and mundane rules of litigation described in
CommercialLitigation against academic theories about the social utility
of litigation does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that the system
requires major surgery. Even though many "insider's" virtues are widely
disparaged, Professors Ronald J. Gilson and Robert H. Mnookin
("G&M") challenge the dominant impression that litigators magnify the
inherent divisiveness and cost of dispute resolution by offering a
conceptual foundation for the alternate view that litigators (among other
lawyers) do "the Lord's work of facilitating cooperation,"' thereby

62. For example, see ROTH & ROTH, supra note 44, which includes, among other popular
ridicule, dialogue by the character Strepsiades, who wants to become a rhetorician (lawyer), from
Aristophanes' The Clouds:
Bold, hasty, and wise, a concocter of lies,
A rattler to speak, a dodger, a sneak,
A regular claw of the tables of law,
A shuffler complete, well worn in deceit,
A supple, unprincipled, troublesome cheat,
A hang-dog accurst, a bore with the worst,
In the tricks of the jury-courts thoroughly versed.
ARISTOPHANES, THE CLOUDS (Benjamin Bickley Rogers trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1969) (423 B.C.).
63. See ORLEY ASHENFELTER & DAVID BLOOM, LAWYERS AS AGENTS OF THE DEVIL INA
PRISONER'S DILEMMA GAME (National Bureau of Econ. Research Working Paper No. 4447, 1993).
64. Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Disputing Through Agents: Cooperation and
ConflictBetween Lawyers in Litigation, 94 COLUM. L. REV.509, 525 n.42 (1994).
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solving problems as agents for their clients that clients could not solve
by themselves. Under this view, the laborious signaling and shadowboxing of the kind which is so well documented in Commercial
Litigationis transformed into socially constructive behavior which results
in efficient and valuable dispute resolution.
G&M construct their optimistic model of the legal profession by
using the "prisoner's dilemma" as an heuristic to understand the
dynamics of dispute resolution.6 5 In a world without lawyers, the model
suggests, two parties locked in a dispute would suffer by their mutual
distrust: although cooperation would result in a superior outcome or
"payoff" for both parties due in part to the avoidance of transaction costs,
each party will nevertheless forego cooperation or will "defect" due to
fear of exploitation by the other party, resulting in a sub-optimal payout
to both.66
According to the model, lawyers-and the legal system and its rules,
67
more generally--help clients to overcome the prisoner's dilemma.
Lawyers are "repeat players who have the opportunity to establish
reputations 6' and in this respect are different from their clients, for
whom litigation with a particular adversary is most likely a one-time
affair.69 If clients know that mutual cooperation will result in the best
payout they will select, instead of "gladiators," cooperative lawyers as
their agents, whose reputations "credibly commit each party to a
cooperative strategy,"7' thereby alleviating each client's fear of exploitation by his adversary.7' For the purposes of the current discussion it is
notable that the model holds that in typical discovery proceedings in a
world of cooperative professional norms, even the most damaging
evidence will be passed along to opponents. 2 Through the G&M lens,
the legal regime-which appears to outsiders to encourage wasteful
misconduct-could be transformed by relatively minor adjustments into

65. See id. at 512. G&M relate that the game was devised in 1950 by two RAND researchers.
See id. at 514 n.15. There is extensive social science and legal studies literature which relates the
prisoner's dilemma to bargaining and negotiation situations. See id.
66. See id. at 512, 514-15.
67. See id. at 512, 522-33.
68. Id. at 513.
69. See id. at 512-13.
70. Id. at 513.
71. G&M limit their model of cooperation to "disputes in which lawyers must be retained."
Id. at 525 n.42 (emphasis added). The effect of this assumption appears to limit applicable situations
dramatically since, particularly in commercial cases, disputes could possibly be resolved without
lavyers or without going out-of-house for lawyers.
72. See id. at 514-15.
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an efficient vehicle for cooperative conflict resolution. This optimistic,
transformative view of legal game-playing sustains the constructive selfimage that litigators in the past have held: litigators have preferred to
think of themselves as facilitators and problem-solvers in an adversarial
system which, if the proper "payoff structure" applies, is both necessary
and beneficial.
Without pouring water over the thesis that the rules of ethics and
procedure might someday be restructured to turn lawyers more frequently
into valuemakers, it would seem based on New York practice that the
effort required to do so would be Herculean. A review of other literature
as well as the advice given in CommercialLitigation confirms the view
that the cooperation model does not simulate a large subset of real-life
commercial litigation situations. The rules for litigation in New York
have not been, are not now, and are not likely soon to be constructed,
enforced, or applied by the parties in ways that, in general, encourage
cooperative behavior.73
To begin with, the New York bar probably did not become a
leading reservoir of litigation talent or a leading commercial law
jurisdiction because of the cooperative dispute resolution skills of its bar
so much as because of its counseling and transactional expertise. Nor did
the "litigation explosion" which New York experienced in recent decades
have very much to do with an exogenous rise in the volume of disputes
to which litigators could add economic value by their skill.74 Indeed,
trying to account for the litigation explosion during the 1960s and 1970s
in New York State (as measured by case filings), Professor William E.
Nelson suggests other causes for the explosion, having little to do with
cooperation; among them, profit-seeking motives of attorneys (delay by
debtors/defendants was rewarded because prejudgment interest rates fell
far below market interest rates) and the demise of a homogeneous bar
and a nonlitigious professional culture.7 5
If there ever appeared to be an economic advantage for a law firm,
specializing in litigation, in projecting a reputation for cooperation with
opposing counsel, that has not been the view of most of the members of

73. G&M suggest various structural, sociological, and communication problems which may
explain why cooperative cultures might not exist. See id. at 516-20, 527-33, 534-43.
74. See id. at 534 ("Two conclusions about the character of large commercial litigation have
emerged in recent years, one empirical and relating to its [heightened] frequency, the second
subjective and relating to its [acrimonious] conduct.").
75. See id. at 535-37 (citing William E. Nelson, Contract Litigation and the Elite Bar in New
York City, 1960-1980, 39 EMoRY LJ. 413 (1990)).
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the New York litigation bar during recent decades. In the opinion of New
York litigators, "gladiatorial" combat between adversaries, especially in
discovery proceedings, became unmerciful:
[C]ommercial litigators attested to the increasingly uncivil conduct of
civil litigation. The phenomenon of discovery abuse was the most
obvious manifestation. Over-reaching requests for production were met
with dogged resistance to any but perfunctory compliance, and the
liberal discovery contemplated by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure-which aimed to eliminate surprise and facilitate a resolution 7of
6
the merits based on full information-led instead to trench warfare.
The benefits flowing from prolonging and brutalizing the process of
litigation appear to have increased in recent years. New York litigators
as a group have come to believe that the system of discovery (federal or
state) has fostered neither civility as a norm nor cooperation as an
ethic.

77

Many of the descriptive parts and much of the advice given in
Commercial Litigation offer this atomistic perspective. Commercial
Litigation portrays a world of uncooperative behavior induced by a
system which has been for the most part within the control of the
profession itself.7 In the world these volumes describe, normally
honorable civil attorneys and their litigation teams encounter adversaries
who normally are also honorable. Nevertheless, the adversary sometimes
becomes pugnacious and deceitful in the course of the litigation process.
As Commercial Litigation authors David L. Hoffberg and Carol E.
Warren put it, "[T]he world is not perfect, a lawyer does not always have
a strong bargaining position and even if he does, the other side may be
irrational, rude and obstructionist."79 In some contexts, such as in
settlement negotiations, civil behavior may be the lawyer's best
response.8 0 In discovery battles, however, pugnacious behavior requires
the normally civil and honorable protagonist to do "what is necessary"

76. Id. at 535.
77. See id. at 511 n.10 (citing a survey in which discovery problems accounted for
approximately 94% of incivility complaints).
78. In a theoretical framework, this perspective has been described as "legal centric," since it
presumes that the profession itself controls the operative conditions of its own professionalism. See
Ronald J. Gilson & Robert H. Mnookin, Business Lawyers and Value Creationfor Clients, 74 OR.
L. REv. 1, 4 (1995).
79. 2 COMMERCIAL LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 27.7(b).
80. See 2 id. § 27.7(b)-(c), at 906-07.
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and to become uncivil and perhaps ever-so-slightly dishonorable. 8'
Consider the advice Garrard R. Beeney offers about how to avoid
losing control upon an interruption by opposing counsel during a
deposition. Treating the adversary as invisible, irrelevant, and impotent
is quite proper under the circumstances:
There are several methods to [stay in] control.... One is to

ignore opposing counsel-let him or her make his or her speech or
objection, do not respond, and ask the witness "please answer the
question." Opposing counsel may cease the interruptions once you
indicate they are having no effect. The behavior normally will stop
once counsel perceives that attempts at interruption are having no effect
on your examination,
and that you believe opposing counsel to be
82
"inconsequential."
Readers are instructed that the formally acceptable options in this
situation are uncertain of success and likely to backfire:
Another potential response is to demand that the improper
objections cease. If they do not, and you are sure of your legal grounds,
you can threaten to call the court, threaten to make a motion seeking
the appointment of a referee to preside at the deposition at the opposing
party's expense, or threaten to seek sanctions. It is critical, however
.. , not to threaten to take action you are not prepared to actually carry
out. A hollow threat results in a loss of credibility, and opposing
counsel
will only be encouraged in his or her effort to take advan83
tage.

The system described does not make it easy to enforce the pretrial
obligations of parties; in the language of G&M, there is a lot of84
"observable" misconduct, and little of this misconduct is "verifiable.,"
Even worse, attorneys are instructed that a failure at enforcement is a
worse outcome than having made no attempt at all because of the
unfortunate signal that failure sends, even at a preliminary stage.
Under the hypothetical that G&M construct, a proper payoff
structure, which rewards cooperation over gladiatorial litigation, and the
existence of a workable reputation market are capable of creating an

81. For example, protecting the record in depositions is a basic requirement of good lawyering
and must weigh ahead of any sort of concern about etiquette or civil behavior: "At bottom, you
cannot be bashful about protecting the record and you must do what is necessary." 2 id. § 19.7(b),
at 651.
82. 2 id. § 19.6(f), at 649.
83. 2 id.
84. See Gilson & Mnookin, supranote 64, at 526-27.
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environment where lawyers may become socially desirable valuemakers.
Under the current litigation structure in New York (and other places, no
doubt), neither reward for cooperation8 5 nor reputational considerationst 6 are potent enough for the authors of Commercial Litigation to
recommend an approach that might accurately be described as cooperative. Further, it is doubtful, frankly, that the reforms suggested by
G&M-which principally consist of changing codes of professional
conduct to overcome the possible conflict between zealous advocacy and
cooperative representation, and improving the capacity for cooperators to
be identified 87-- will dramatically affect uncooperative behavior in
commercial litigation. The problem is more permanently entrenched than
G&M believe.
V.

INSTITUTIONAL

BIAS AND ERROR

Commercial Litigation documents many instances in which
unfairness and bias toward particular parties to litigation have been
institutionalized through procedural rules and case law decisions. Among
those who appear to have fared worse in New York than in some other
jurisdictions by court interpretations of procedural rights and doctrine are
subcontractors, insureds, environmentalists, and at-will employees.
Consider the following representative problems:
Gary L. Rubin and Sayward Mazur report that New York courts in
construction industry cases usually tolerate contractual dispute resolution
procedures which designate a hearing officer, often employed by the
85. The ethical rules governing the secret taping by one lawyer of a conversation with an
adversary provide a rather remarkable indication that some New York rules can discourage
cooperation and certainty, see discussion supraPart II, simultaneously. Authors Richard L. Bond and
Stewart D. Aaron relate that the Committee on Professional Ethics of the New York County
Lawyers' Association issued an opinion in 1993 stating that such taping is not unethical; less than
two years later the Committee on Professional and Judicial Ethics of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York found that it was unethical. See 3 COMMERCIAL LITIGATION, supra note 1,
§ 50.4(b), at 1004.
86. Interestingly, one legal environment where G&M's prisoner's dilemma model may apply
is in New York's new and special Commercial Part, where there are many repeat players.
Commercial Litigation suggests that cooperation is greater there:
[Several Manhattan IAS Commercial Part judges] noted that it is rare in state court to
find acrimony or tension between lawyers that would preclude stipulations on the
admissibility of exhibits, deposition testimony, or an agreement based on offers of proof.
This may, in part, be the result of the recognition that there have been only four
Commercial Parts, and commercial litigators will likely appear before the same judge
frequently.
3 id. § 31.2(d), at 61.
87. See Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 64, at 550-64.
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contractor, to make binding determinations concerning contract claims.
Whether these provisions are enforceable is "[o]ne of the most controver88
sial issues presently facing New York construction attorneys."
Kevin J. Walsh, Jennifer B. Bernheim, and Kevin C. Walker state
that New York courts enforce adhesive provisions in insurance contracts
which dictate short and even arbitrary notice requirements to insureds.
They call the rule "frequently a harsh one for insureds." 89 They observe
that even where equitable considerations might be applied to excuse poor
notice, these considerations are given only lip service:
[W]hile numerous New York cases recognize that an insured's untimely
notification can be excused, very few New York cases actually excuse
it. Instead, most cases simply note that untimeliness may be excused,
cite to opinions stating the same rule, then distinguish those cases in
order to hold that the insured's delay in notifying was unreasonable and
therefore inexcusable. 90
Behind this unyielding enforcement policy lies an inequitable allocation
of loss between insurers and insureds. No easier to understand is the
doctrine that New York courts will not award punitive damages for a
breach of an insurance contract, "even a willful, unjustified or bad faith
breach." 91
In land use disputes, Stephen L. Kass, Jean M. McCarrol, and
Robert Malaby indicate, New York Article 78 proceedings offer "two
overwhelming advantages to the developer's and agency's counsel: the
deferential standard of review ...and the respondents' ability to submit
a record that, with very rare exceptions, is not subject to either crossexamination or supplementation by the petitioners' counsel."'92 The law,
in the end, favors developers and impairs environmentalists.
Author John F. Cannon reports that in contrast to some other
jurisdictions, New York courts are unsympathetic to wrongful dismissal
claims by at-will employees, and have taken the approach that "where the
employment is at-will the covenant [of good faith and fair dealing]
cannot be invoked to make a discharge unlawful. 93

88. 4 COMMERCiAL LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 65.11, at 765. The discussion indicates that

a resolution of this sort was upheld by the New York State Court of Appeals in Westinghouse
Electric Corp. v. New York City Transit Authority, 623 N.E.2d 531 (N.Y. 1993).

89. 4 COMMERCIAL LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 52A(a), at 97.
90. 4 id. § 52.4(a), at 98.
91. 4 id. § 52.7(c), at 124.

92. 4 id. § 66A(b)(4), at 810.
93. 4 id. § 56A(b)(3), at 282.
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Some of the procedural rules that are criticized are not likely to
work to the advantage of any particular group, but instead operate to the
detriment of the system as a whole. The expert disclosure rules, for
example, are "very limited. 9 4 According to J. Peter Coll, Jr. and
Christopher P. Johnson, they "do little to inform the adversary about
expert testimony" which may be introduced. 95 Bernice K. Leber
observes, matter-of-factly, that time-barred claims may sometimes be
revived through "back door" consolidation. 6
The authors of Commercial Litigation rarely speculate or theorize
about the sources of bias or inconsistency or the absence of unifying
principles in the law--as they do when explaining the decisions of judges
and the verdicts of juries. 97 Few allusions are found to the inadequate
resources for representation of weaker groups, the socio-economic power
and influence of stronger ones, or the identification of members of the
judiciary with the interest of particular groups. The authors present the
institutional bias that produces social injustice as a background condition
of the law, about which litigators require instruction, to attempt to avoid
or avert the consequences.
VI.

CONCLUSION: CONFRONTING THE LITIGATION "CRISIS"

In the literature there are many different conceptions of the litigation
crisis. The authors of Commercial Litigation, mostly attorneys who are
engaged in litigation on an everyday basis, express one that is fairly
ordinary: in New York, the crisis is caused by too many cases and not
enough resources. "The increasing volume of litigation and the increasing
complexity of many commercial cases," the editor-in-chief writes, "have
placed an insupportable burden on the present system that threatens
timely and thoughtful resolution of disputes," leading many businesses
to turn to the federal courts and to "states such as Delaware and to
private dispute resolution."98 This evaluation of the situation does not
gravely implicate the need for changing procedures, revising codes of

94. See 2 id. § 23.3, at 759.
95. 2id.

96. See 2 id. § 12.10, at 372. The example provided is the case 64th Street-Third Avenue
Associates v. Maroulis,519 N.Y.S.2d 990 (App. Div. 1987) (mem.), where, well after the statute of
limitations for pursuing an earlier action had run, the court allowed consolidation with a new action
on the grounds that the estate's right to an accounting "related back" to the complaint filed in the
earlier action. See 2 CothsiciAL LITIGATION, supra note 1, § 12.10, at 372 n.42.
97. See supra Part I.
98. Robert L. Haig, Forewordto 2 COMMERCIAL LITIGATION, supra note 1, at XI.
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professional conduct, tightening up judicial discretion, restructuring law
firms, reshaping professional associations, or otherwise altering the
culture of litigation.
Academics with divergent theoretical inclinations tend to agree that
the litigation system is in a deeper sort of a crisis than that to which
CommercialLitigation refers. The crisis from their perspective is caused
by developments such as a decline in professional autonomy,99 heightened incivility among litigators,'
spiraling litigation costs,"01 and
2
diminished public confidence.
Other writers have examined law
practice more broadly and have blamed many political, social, and moral
factors, including a general decline in professionalism among lawyers. 0 3 From all of these vantage points, the increasing resort by
lawyers, in-house counsel, and even entire industries, to various forms of
ADR, including mandatory arbitration and mediation, are symptomatic
of despair with the current court-based system of dispute resolution.
As might be expected when there are different definitions of the
problem, there are divergent opinions about appropriate solutions.
Professor Jeffrey W. Stempel has discussed the dialogue about solutions
between litigation "reformers" and "preservationists" as between those
who want to shift disputes toward ADR and those who want to retain the
existing procedural rules and enrich the resources available:
Reformers want substantial change in the litigation system, reduced
litigation volume, a net shift in disputes from litigation to ADR,
reduced disputing costs and damage awards and faster determination of
disputes. Preservationists, while not strictly opposed to these objectives
(for who [could] oppose lower costs and faster resolution in the

99. See, e.g., Posner, supra note 37, at 769-71 (discussing the collapse of lawyers' selfconfidence regarding their ability to rectify problems with the legal system on their own).
100. See generally Gilson & Mnookin, supra note 64.
101. See, e.g., Jay Folberg et al., Use ofADR in California Courts:Findings & Proposals,26

U.S.F. L. REV. 343, 349. See generally Symposium, Reducing the Costs of Civil Litigation, 37
RUTGERS L. REv. 217 (1985).
102. See, e.g., SOL M. LINOwITZ WITH MARTIN MAYER, THE BETRAYED PROFESSION:
LAWYERING AT THE END OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 5 (1994); Folberg et al., supranote 101, at

351. See generally Bruce M. Selya, The Confidence Game: Public Perceptions of the Judiciary,30
NEW ENG. L. REV. 909 (1996).
103. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRisis IN
THE LEGAL PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994); LINOWiTz WITH MAYER,
supra note 102; Bryant Garth, From Civil Litigation to PrivateJustice: Legal Practiceat War with
the Profession and Its Values, 59 BROOK. L. REv. 931 (1993).
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abstract?), fear that the reformist agenda will ... create more problems
than it solves ... 104
According to preservationists, ADR and mediation may achieve their
objectives only "at the cost of reducing the accuracy and justice of
dispute resolution."' 5
Focus on the litigation culture may produce another, litigatorcentered, view of "crisis" and appropriate responses. Where do litigators
stand in the hierarchy of larger firms? What are the typical satisfactions
and frustrations in the workdays of commercial litigators? What are the
emotional, physical, and interpersonal costs? How successful have
women and discriminated-against minorities been in surviving and
thriving as litigators? 10 6 There is an emerging body of information about
07
these matters which speaks to a crisis of a more personal nature;1
Commercial Litigation was of course intended to be a reference book
rather than a tract or empirical study, and so it does not have much to
say directly about the culture of litigation or about reforms to the
litigation system or the nature of law firm practice that would be
appropriate to improve it.
Professor Bryant Garth has written that the imperatives of modem
legal practice are "at war with the profession and its values. ' 10 8 A
reading of CommercialLitigation, however, suggests that litigators have
avoided "war" and turned instead to a process of "internal" dispute
resolution. They have resigned themselves to a cold assessment of the
fluidity of legal doctrine and the limited capacity of their own legal
training and preparation to direct the outcomes of disputes. Their
attitudes about the way judges, juries, adversaries, and clients behave
have helped them to adapt to many aspects of the crisis that insiders and
outsiders have been distressed about-the loss of autonomy, the
acrimony, the delay, the costliness, and the difficulty in counseling and
litigating efficiently. These natural attitudes, however, crowd out and

104. Stempel, supranote 31, at 691.
105. Id.
106. For a discussion of how women have fared in achieving partnership, see Barbara B.
Buchholz, Slow Gainsfor Women Who Would Be Partners,N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 1996, at F10.
107. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, THE REPORT OF AT THE BREAKING POINT: A NATIONAL
CONFERENCE ON THE EMERGING CRISIS INTHE QUALITY OF LAWYERS' HEALTH AND LivEs-ITS
IMPACT ON LAW FIRMS AND CLIENT SERVICES (1991); Mark I. Satin, Law and Psychology: A
Movement Whose Time Has Come, 1994 ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 581, 585-88; Merrilyn Astin Tarlton
& Simon Chester, It's Broken but We Can Fix It: Developing a Plan to Move the ProfessionBeyond
the Breaking Point, LAW PRAC. MGMT., Mar. 1996, at 24.
108. Garth, supra note 103, at 931.
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sometimes exclude professionally and socially prized values--values such
as collegiality, solidarity, cooperation, and professional independence.' 09
In the longer run, this kind of value reconciliation proves deeply
unsatisfactory.

109. See, e.g., Frederick W. Lambert, A PreliminaryInquiry into the Transcendence of Value
Creation, 74 OR. L. REv. 121, 126, 139-45 (1995).
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